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Through capitalism's biopolitics, 9 the bourgeois-controlled global legal order presents investment as an opportunity to prosper. 10 However, international laws that were promoted by the capitalexporting nations are waning since the West became an importer of capital, especially from China and Arab countries. While there is a rise of nationalism and protectionism in Western countries against non-Western capital, new investors from the non-West seek a robust protection of their investment through old international law. What is the role of capitalism in this new global legal-social reversal? Clearly, the 1997 and 2008-2009 financial crises provide antitheses to capitalism's unqualified lyricism. At a time when globalization is promoting a seamless flow of capital, my Article questions the relationship between international law, capitalism, and the common good.
Shakespeare's Macbeth talks about three witches. They appear in four scenes in the play to foretell and direct the fate of the drama, and the character Macbeth's fascination with them underlines much of the play's action. 11 But the witches of Macbeth, Albright observes, "nowhere gnash their teeth or rage at the triumph of justice; in fact their plan succeeds in every last detail." 12 He thinks this can be explained "in the orthodox Christian fashion, as the subsumption of partial evils into the universal good."
13 If Macbeth's three witches are replaced by capitalism, the common good, and international law, capitalism can be understood as the necessary evil for the larger common good that international law purportedly promotes. Just as the three witches of Macbeth, capitalism, common good and international law are capable of foretelling and controlling the narrative of human lives. One of such narratives comes out as what Žižek identifies as the only true question: 9 First used by Lynton Caldwell, "biopolitics" refers to the application of theories and methods from the life sciences toward the scientific understanding of political behavior. See Caldwell, Biopolitics, 56 YALE REV. 1 (1964) . 10 According to Chimni, contemporary international law may be characterized as bourgeois imperialist international law which codifies the interests of an emerging transnational capitalist class at the expense of interests of TOC and substantive global democracy. See B.S. Chimni 
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The only true question today is: does global capitalism contain antagonisms strong enough to prevent its indefinite reproduction? Four possible antagonisms present themselves: the looming threat of ecological catastrophe; the inappropriateness of private property for so-called intellectual property; the socio-ethical implications of new techno-scientific developments, especially in biogenetics; and last, but not least, new forms of social apartheid-new walls and slums.
14 As another crisis looms over the international financial horizon, richer countries have begun financial introspection. In the wake of "long-run budget deficit," in September 2011 U.S. President Barack Obama announced larger tax hikes for wealthier Americans. Reportedly, the Republicans, Krugman observed, responded with shrieks of "class warfare." 15 The world now looks to China, the biggest reservoir of American currency, for rescue. 16 After all, an economic performance this fine by China can paper over any number of communist sins of the past.
"Enter Macbeth With Hammer and Sickle" is what a Wall Street
Journal column read on the seventh anniversary of the September 11th attack. 18 Surely, our Macbeth is the tale of betrayal: albeit who among international law, capitalism, and the common good is eventually betrayed is slightly easier to figure out.
Financial services industries after Bretton Woods "sought to make a virtue of disequilibrium, treating volatility and risk as productive forces in their own right for a globally circulating economy of credit and debt." 19 Since then, two economic crises in little more than a decade have exposed Western and non-Western states' relationship with capitalism. Just before the 2007 financial crisis, Weber and 52
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Arner discussed a possible new design of international financial regulation with bold conclusions. 20 But capitalism has become a story of broken promises. The insistence that the "future be lived out in the present constitutes an abandonment of capital's own utopian promise of progress for all through a dream machinery that would yield secure deferral of something better to come." 21 However, international economic lawyers will certainly contest this position; they would point to the success of postwar Bretton Woods institutions, the triumph of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other liberalizing institutions that seek to mobilize capital around the world by opening up markets. Weber and Arner's work is an example of such a premise. They drew three conclusions:
First, . . . that the international standards framework should be expanded and modified to explicitly incorporate development goals in addition to stability. While financial stability is a central goal, financial development should merit the same attention . . . Second, in looking at the international standards framework, issues of competition and financial liberalization and their role in both financial stability and development should also be covered. Third, beyond the standards initiative, the international financial architecture deserves further attention-if not a full Bretton Woodsstyle review, then at least to take into account the WTO and related financial services frameworks and to address financial crisis resolution in a more coherent manner, and address interactions with global climate change mechanisms. 22 However, most aspects of the so-called "new design" seem to have fallen on their face as the world enters into a new phase of financial insecurity. 23 In light of the new fortunes of the old developing countries due to "escalated oil prices and the exponential growth of emerging markets," 28 Sornarajah thinks that developed states might "dismantle to a significant extent the international law they had created to protect foreign investment and retreat into principles of sovereignty earlier advocated by the developing states."
29 Perhaps other areas of international law might undergo similar self-reflections.
30
A. Is There a Universal Common Good?
Historically, universalism, as the West's international law project, did not see common good as its end, much like the Enlightenment thinkers who did not assign much value to global diversity. 31 Only after the two world wars did the West begin to project international law as a universal agent or agent of the common good. 32 The thinkers Strong sovereignty has always been an anathema for the very idea of a global common good; pitched at a high level of abstraction, common good has never been the goal of those who fashioned modern sovereignty. Modern sovereignty is a clever mix of the insulation from Others' emotions and the projection of domestic needs as the need of everyone. Having understood the concept of sovereignty from their masters, post decolonization, however, new independent people of the Third World distinguished the West's common good from that of the non-West's peoples on account of their lived experiences. 34 Capital, mostly in the form of natural resources and raw materials, stood right at the center of how the former colonizers and Third World people saw their economic growth and development. 35 Consequently, state responsibility due to financial, physical, and economic injuries by aliens became a lively subject of cross-examination between Western and non-Western scholars.
36 Indian judge Guha Roy, for example, generated quite an rather than international in scope, the second protocol afforded greater protection to guerilla combatants in civil wars or wars of "self- While the Western capital-exporting countries wanted more than national protection for their investment in the newly independent countries, the new sovereigns would not afford more than what they gave to their nationals. These were early post-war signs of unease between international law, capitalism, and the common good. Clearly, decolonization had bred new issues of sovereignty and of citizenship versus human rights. In 1843, while replying to Bauer on the "Jewish Question," Marx expressed his skepticism about automatic human emancipation guaranteed allegedly by political emancipation through citizenship within a state. 38 Under the forces of globalization, when the traditional states today have been unbundled creating a so-called global state through the force of technology, capitalism has clearly redrawn the boundary between a developed country's citizen and a poor country's human.
Examples abound: for instance, Paulsen has argued for the United States Constitution's complete powers in trumping international law, which also includes human rights. 39 For him, under the United States Constitution, the U.S. state can't be held accountable for waging wars or other international sins. His theory of constitutional supremacy internationally wrongful acts," and requested the Secretary-General to invite governments to submit their written comments on any future action regarding the articles. Id. Compilation of decisions of international courts, tribunals, and other bodies referring to the articles was another task that the General Assembly commended. Id. It sought to invite Governments to submit information on their practice in this regard. The Secretary-General is also supposed to submit this material well in advance of the 62nd session along with the decision to include the compilation in the provisional agenda of its 62nd session an item entitled "Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts." Id. 
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Macbeth's Three Witches: Capitalism, Common 57 Good, & International Law must succeed at the cost of human lives in invaded countries. His "gleeful dismissal of international law" 40 empowers the U.S., simultaneously dismantling the rights of poor humans around the world who may be attacked by U.S.-led forces (and drones) to have their rights and lives jeopardized.
Indeed, as Tomuschat asserts, "it is a matter of public knowledge that the invasion by the coalition forces on 20 March 2003 had no support from the Security Council." 41 The invasion amounted to a violation of article 2(4) of the United Nation's (U.N.) Charter. "The U.N. only recognized the occupation once the coalition forces decided that it would be politically useful to obtain legal backing, or at least international legitimacy, for their occupation of Iraq." 42 Yet, in the AlJedda case, 43 the United Kingdom (U.K.) argued that it was the U.N. that had the effective control of the operations and the U.K. was thus not responsible.
A certain Jewish Question thus converts into a global South's human question. The war on terror is its most apt example. The conflict is between American citizens' security and Afghani or Iraqi citizens' elimination till the latter begins to conform to the former's demands. This situation calls for explanations and there can be many.
B. The Nature of Humans
One can start from the nature of man and end with the details on the destructive power of the capital. In other words, one can start with Freud's "psychoanalytic humanism" where, like Hobbes, we assume a man to be a bundle of suppressed evil desires seeking manifestation in tendencies of war, bloodshed, and other psychic pleasures. 44 The common good as the end of the global deliberative process owes a lot to twentieth century theorizations about the nature of a man, as for Nietzsche all moralities are based on prevailing customs of a group of people and the philosophical beliefs which have come up to justify them. 46 Allegedly Western philosophy has still not emerged from the "Nietzschean dead end" of the death of God and all kinds of moralism. 47 For Nietzsche, God died in a very particular sense; "[h]e no longer plays his traditional social role of organizing us around a commitment to a single right way to live." 48 Who in this globalized world are the prevailing group of people? With the alarming rate in which the injustices in the world are increasing, we can safely put blame on a phenomenon rather than a person. What will that phenomenon be? Capitalism might be the most obvious answer, but also the toughest to prove. With capital's omnipresence and its acquired omnipotence, it is surely difficult to put it in the witness box straight away. Therefore, it is perhaps apt to study a human as, to borrow Spirkin's formulation, "biosocial," one that produces the society and is in turn produced by it. 49 The common good, such as the welfare of men, women, and children, protection of human rights, access to good environment, and that we are divided creatures. Reason, which is trustworthy, is separate from the emotions, which are suspect. Society progresses to the extent that reason can suppress the passions. This has created a distortion in our culture . . Unfortunately today the concept of a "risk society" governs our major deliberations. The capitalist ideology, through a variety of investment instruments, first uses the free market to generate riskssocial, cultural, political, medical, and environmental-and then sells this paranoia as insurance coverage, sometimes with the capitalist state's guarantee. In a new Hegelian reflexive, a welfare state is first dismantled and then presented as "the opportunity for new freedoms" under the aegis of volatile and vulture capitalism. 
C. Human Rights as Malleable Rights?
The truth, however, is different within international law. While there are stronger rights for developed countries' citizens, backed by U.N. resolutions, NATO's might, and unparalleled capital support, the rights of poor countries' humans remain malleable rights often flattened by citizens' rights as seen in the war on terror. 51 For some time the notion of a "Divided West" worked to assuage those who felt the heat of capitalism in the war on terror, but that myth stands busted, to the disappointment of those who believed in human rights. 52 No wonder, as Zook points out, that "human rights has always been one of the most problematic elements of the U.N. system in terms of the discrepancies between rhetoric and practice; compliance remains incomplete and enforcement remains inconsistent at best." 53 Surely, it is human versus citizen today. Bill Richardson, exgovernor of New Mexico, once wrote that America "should lead the world toward a global norm of respect for basic human rights-and toward enforcing that norm through international institutions and Thus in the case of citizen versus human, while the alleged freedom of the free markets mostly offers multiple freedoms to certain political citizens, it works to render pre-political humans fundamentally unfree. Better still, we should problematize the opposition between every human's general universal rights and a citizen's specific political rights. 56 In the ongoing war on terror, this problematization is illuminating: how the political rights of an American citizen subvert an Iraqi, Afghani, or Pakistani human, i.e., the right to live in a war-free world.
57
While humans find no sponsors to defend their human rights, the citizens, depending upon the relative strength of their country's economy and political muscle, find their rights guaranteed. 58 As the human versus citizen debate entails, there is no universal common good in a global market's life-world. One may also note Upendra Baxi's remarks that today's market economy has "human rights investors, producers and consumers" as players. 59 There are ample examples. In January 2011 the Indian Ministry for Environment "gave the state permission to divert 3,100 acres of forest to the [$12 billion] plant" of POSCO, a multinational steel company after "[a] government panel had earlier said the plant's environmental clearances should be scrapped." 60 The plant has faced stiff opposition from the local people, campaigning to save farmland and forests. 
2012]
Macbeth's Three Witches: Capitalism, Common 61
Good, & International Law
We can thus see that capital spells out the conditions of its own applications. It co-opts its critique with time.
The huge coffers of corporate social responsibility that multinational companies have been forced to develop by various jurisdictions like India 62 make Baxi's prophecies inevitable. Thus at a time the liberal citizens produce human rights for periodic consumption by un-free humans in poorer parts of the world, capital ensures that that there is enough liquidity of human rights to help investors and consumers of human rights stay in business.
II THE COMMON GOOD'S THEORIES AND CAPITALISM'S ROLE
In natural law's metaphysical world, there is no unanimity on the nature of the common good. Though these differences are not trivial, I will straightaway borrow Mark Murphy's conclusion that aggregate common good is better than instrumental or distinctive common good. 63 Murphy thus contradicts Finnis's love for instrumental common good. 64 The common good is often argued as having "Aristotelian roots," while Marx-Engels drew capitalism to the center of political theory. 65 However, without a doubt Aristotle is not the sole theorist of the common good; Thomas Aquinas, the tenth century paradigmatic natural law theorist, wrote about the common good within the vocabulary of justice and peace. 66 The U.N. Charter of 1945 perhaps borrows Aquinas in its preamble: "establish conditions under which justice . . ." and "live together in peace." 67 In its preamble, the U.N. also recalls Hobbes in the process assuming the "natural condition of mankind" as terrible and short. Mankind thus must come to an agreement to govern its life by an absolute political sovereign. How are we to plant capital within the function of the state and the law? Arguably, Aristotle's idea of the "common good speaks to both liberals and communitarians."
OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the postcolonial world, an Aristotelian realist must ask: whose "common good"? What makes an international community? Aquinas, according to Murphy, "appeals to the common good in his accounts of the definition of law" and "the dictates issued by political authority."
69 About Aristotle, Thomas Smith says, "[t]he common good was once a central problem in political theory because it provided a framework for thinking about the relationship between individual interests and the interests of the community." Capitalism as an abstract economic order requires certain universal conditions for its operation: stable rights of private property, predictable legal rules, some procedures of arbitration, and (crucially) mechanisms to ensure the subordination of labour. But this is a competitive system, whose motor is rivalry between economic agents. Such competition has no 'natural' ceiling: once it becomes international, the Darwinian struggle between firms has an inherent tendency to escalate to the level of states. There, however, as the history of the first half of the twentieth century repeatedly showed, it can have disastrous consequences for the system itself. 75 However, Capitalist Darwinism's hollowness becomes 76 rather obvious when, among other examples, scholars establish that "war and profit have always gone hand in hand" 77 and that some countries will remain poor because they possess oil.
78
Small surprise, then, that the humanitarian laws or laws of war are not about stopping wars; they tell us how to conduct a good war and how to justify it! William Connolly aptly calls this the specters of "cowboy capitalism." 79 Quite expectedly Žižek harbors a rather radical view on capitalism: "the history of capitalism is a long history of how the predominant ideological political framework was able to 75 C] onsider the 'Great Recession' and the subsequent near-collapse of public finances as a manifestation of a basic underlying tension in the political-economic configuration of advanced-capitalist societies; a tension which makes disequilibrium and instability the rule rather than the exception, and which has found expression in a historical succession of disturbances within the socio-economic order. More specifically, I will argue that the present crisis can only be fully understood in terms of the ongoing, inherently conflictual transformation of the social formation we call 'democratic capitalism'") (footnote omitted). 85 86 What is problematic here is that a law that is public is gradually replaced by a private concept; breach of contract is a private law concept.
International investment law has seen some of the most antiinternational or anti-public and pro-private justifications. As Sornarajah insightfully points out, multinational companies wielded unfair powers over host countries by manipulating "lower order sources of international law, such as judicial decision, [and] the writings of highly qualified publicists." 87 Indeed "[i]t subjects many respected academics to a charge of an absence of neutrality in the pursuit of their disciplines."
88
Posner and Sykes seem to forget that regulating public international law by private law concepts may be efficient for capitalists but not for the universal good. In other words, what is efficient for the citizens of the developed countries is not so efficient for poor countries' humans. As such, to the detriment of the developing countries, "many of the legal techniques, particularly in the field of foreign investment, were created through the exercise of private power." 89 It is an example of the "private power being used to create public international law."
90 And yet Bogdandy and Venzke argue that the "effect of judicial precedents is concealed by the doctrinal ordering of things in light of Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute which classifies international judicial decisions as 'subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.'" 91 They lament that the decisions of the international courts are "pictured as a source for recognizing the law but not a source of law." 92 One is tempted to ask whether there is a direct relationship between war, peace, and capital. Gartzke, divorced from other theorists, answers in the affirmative. He believes in the idea of a "capitalist 86 See Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 78, at 87. 87 SORNARAJAH, supra note 35, at 277. 88 Id. at 279 n.8. 89 Id. at 278. 90 peace." 93 More than democracies, it is the free flow of capital that would bring peace to the world, he wishfully thinks. 94 McMillan's view on capital is worth noting:
As an illustration, against the rhetoric of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' and the spread of democracy, critics of the US invasion of Iraq have suggested that the attack was motivated by Iraq's vast Oil resources. Conversely, others have suggested that the Bush administration had no issue with Iraq's use of their Oil resources, until they switched from trading their Oil in US Dollars to Euros, threatening the hegemony of the (petro)Dollar as the universal currency of the Oil market. 95 Human freedom today, as an aspect of human rights, does need some attention from naïve formulators of capital's benevolence. In Kantian terms, global capital induces "our acting as 'immature' individuals, not as free human beings who dwell in the dimension of the universality of reason." 96 Just as drowning in water does not mean drinking it, a mere presence of water can create conditions for both consumption and death.
The presence of massive capital similarly can drown an importing community and yet not quench its needs. What will ensure quenching with an insurance against drowning is the freedom of the needy. Wars do not give this; rather, during the times of peace unregulated capital can create war-like battlefields. Capital arrives with its own conditions. A Leninist, Žižek says that "[f]ormal freedom is the freedom of choice within the coordinates of the existing power relations, while actual freedom designates the site of an intervention that undermines these very coordinates." 97 Nevertheless, NATO, the United States and the rest of the capitalist world continue to present war on terror "as a facilitator of historically inevitable transformations." 98 By contrast, the local violence "is presented as emanating from the recesses of a pre-market culture." 99 Given the obvious gifts of capitalism, one wonders whether calling capitalism's effects on the common good in question is a cliché. But capitalism has a high co-optive potential, making its clients feel paranormal in wake of its manifestations. It exists as a suspect metareal engulfing all and the sundry in its discursive expanses. It is often prescribed as a bitter pill, a necessary evil at best. Thus, "'[m]an', the bearer of human rights, is generated by a set of political practices that materialize citizenship; 'human rights' are, as such, a false ideological universality, which masks and legitimizes a concrete politics of Western imperialism, military interventions and neo-colonialism. Is this, however, enough?" 100 Conclusive evidence of capital's villainy is tough to find, but when capital meets the tribal life-style we may perhaps see some ethical evidence against it. 101 In a neat instance of Hegel's "reflexive determination," as Žižek would say, "[a]ll big 'public issues' are now translated into attitudes towards the regulation of 'natural' or 'personal' idiosyncrasies."
102 Therefore "pseudo-naturalized ethnoreligious conflicts are the form of struggle which best suits global capitalism." 103 Should, for example, the predicaments of displacement due to mining projects engender nostalgia about their land, trees, gods, and culture, pro-capital ideologies will brand the tribal people as avatars of jungle lowlife unnecessarily clinging to an archaic lifestyle? 104 Even better, when this view is purposefully reinstated into the ideology of the subject while seeing tribal life-world instrumentallyendowed with Hobbes's "natural" physical attributes of an animal- 100 Žižek, AHR, supra note 50, at 128-29. 101 After having exploited the natural resources so much, India is set to pass a robust new law to regulate mining in India. The proposed Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Bill (2011) is the central government's response to a full-blown crisis in the sector. See Editorial, Stopping the Loot, THE HINDU, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.thehindu .com/opinion/editorial/article2509680.ece. 102 Žižek, AHR, supra note 50, at 117. 103 Id. 
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[Vol. 14, 47 market forces will automatically tend to interpret such resistances as the most natural outcome of a tribal personality, "not as the result of being thrown around by market forces." 105 This creates a situation of fundamental un-freedom, akin to slave trade; trade that makes humans slaves yet enriches citizens. It still is human versus citizen.
C. Capitalism and Its Critique
We are witnessing à la Žižek an overload of critiques of capitalism's horrors. Is it an academic re-invention of the wheel? Have not Marx and the Marxists said enough about it? Perhaps not enough. As early as 1896, Irving Fisher wrote, "[o]f economic conceptions few are more fundamental and none more obscure than capital."
106 Whether this obscurity has vanished in 2012 is an open question. Of free market, the chief vehicle through which capitalism is promoted, Ogletree wrote:
They stimulate productive efficiency and material abundance, and they foster conditions that reinforce basic human liberties. Yet they produce harm as well, in particular, the exploitation of low-skilled workers, and environmental damage. They also give rise to vast inequalities of income and wealth that marginalize disadvantaged members of society. These harmful tendencies are difficult to contain, however, because they are directly linked to factors that render free-market economies effective in the first place. Therefore, the international financial system must in some fashion oversee and regulate market processes for the sake of a broader public 105 Id. good. But this, as Chimni explores, is a cry in the wilderness. 109 There are proofs of lawyers spending ample time wondering whether capital is a legal concept. Cooke's 1937 paper observes a definite "function of money" in the works of jurists like "Pufendorf, Grotius and Montesquieu, a compound theory of political economy and jurisprudence in Adam Smith, and a derivation of justice in Hume's philosophy from the same scarcity of means and ends which is the fundamental postulate of modern economics." 110 The intellectual property regime is one such example. No doubt, only through funded research have scientists developed life-saving drugs. But rent-seeking behaviour goes to the extent of stopping medicine from reaching the needy in poorer parts of the world. The problem is not in the law, law enforcers, or other agents alone. As "public privilege recedes and rights expand," a capital oriented regime further moves intellectual property into grayer areas. 111 A capital-infested ideology will, without a hiccup, declare the subversion of the human rights to life-saving drugs by the intellectual property rights of political citizens.
In the field of international investment law, as Sornarajah notes, citing Benvenuti et Bonfant v. Congo, 112 purely private interests are shaping public international law despite slim legal foundations; in this case support for internationalization of contracts was made at the cost of the sovereign powers of Congo, an African nation. 113 This has been done to tie and curtail the sovereign powers of some states against foreign investors. Using lowly sources of international law like arbitral awards and writings of qualified publicists of international law, Third World states in the 1960s were tied down to private contracts in stark opposition to the principles of state sovereignty.
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D. Capitalism's Bio-Politics
The current bio-politics of the global order delivers humanity to a Žižekian moment of profound revelations, a moment of a capitalist socio-economic reality. As discussed above, a vast world of Marxist literature has dealt with capitalism's question. These authors often argue that "socialist control of economic life requires decentralized decisionmaking to avoid substituting the power of a centralized status hierarchy for the power of those who control the means of production." 118 Today, unfortunately, expert-driven capital inverts Kant. With the paradigmatic use of "private use of reason," European higher education, for instance, seeks to alter the way they problematize social problems. 119 The true task of thinking simply disappears here, not only to offer solutions to problems posed by the violent state and volatile capital, "but to reflect on the very form of these problems; to discern a problem in the very way we perceive a problem." 121 Now, both Marxists in general and Guzman stand at two extremes of a spectrum that sees capital interacting with the idea of the common good in starkly opposite fashion. As Žižek points out:
For example, it is clear that the US-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein, legitimized in terms of ending the suffering of the Iraqi people, was not only motivated by hard-headed politico-economic interests but also relied on a determinate idea of the political and economic conditions under which 'freedom' was to be delivered to the Iraqi people: liberal-democratic capitalism, insertion into the global market economy, etc. 122 Capital is indeed important and its mobility improves living standards, offers options in a market economy, and increases overall prosperity. But this does not spread welfare automatically. Capital flow needs to be trafficked in such a way that benefits reach proportionately to all its actors, participants, and agents. After the fall of the Soviet Union and American capitalism in the 2008-09 crisis, the unregulated market economy has "demonstrated the inherent flaws of that approach by falling into a credit crisis and a consequent major recession." 123 International law becomes important here. To rein in capital, international law must be adequately armed.
III INTERNATIONAL LAW VERSUS THE COMMON GOOD
International financial institutions (IFIs) "derive their mandate and authority from international law, but are averse to observing the international rule of law," Chimni recently wrote. 124 What does this say about the nature of international capital? Our lives today are regulated by a set of treaties, regulations, and guidelines from international organizations such as the U.N., the World Bank, and the IMF that bind states into soft obligations as well as those obligations expressed in the Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda.
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A. The Commandment YOU CANNOT
Looking at the structure of management and decision-making in the IFIs, Chimni argues, "that their unique features reinforce the tendency to neglect subaltern states and groups."
126 And there is a set of people that the World Bank often recognizes as living below the poverty line. This ensemble of capitalism, international law, and the Third World lends itself to see international law as, to borrow Nandy's apt formulation, an "Intimate Enemy." 127 Combine this with what Žižek recently said:
The commandment YOU CANNOT is its mot d'ordre: you cannot engage in large collective acts, which necessarily end in totalitarian terror; you cannot cling to the old welfare state, it makes you noncompetitive and leads to economic crisis; you cannot isolate yourself from the global market, without falling prey to the spectre of North Korean juche. In its ideological version, ecology also adds its own list of impossibilities, so-called threshold values-no more than two degrees of global warming-based on 'expert opinions'.
128
After the Eurozone's austerity measures-probably twice in Greece and, on a smaller scale, Ireland, Italy, and Spain-as Žižek puts it, "protesting workers, students and pensioners," would see such steps as "yet another attempt by international financial capital to dismantle the last remainders of the welfare state." 129 The idea of "a human" in the human rights discourse is thus more rhetorical than ever in the history of mankind.
130
B. Withering Capitalism?
While the capitalist and powerful Western states are struggling to keep their economies in order after the 2008-09 financial crisis, unrest in the Arab world has helped the governments of such states to steer their citizenry towards larger issues of protecting human 126 99 (1997) . "International Law has taken us, or followed us, from co-existence to cooperation, from autonomy to community." Id. at 101. Good, & International Law rights. 131 The benefits of mass psychology are perhaps best milked at these hours; the bigger sorrow of the Others helps one forget one's smaller grief. Could it be that the capitalist states are investing to sustain the Other world's larger sorrow?
One can't answer such queries with any certainty. After all, conspiracy theories such as this do more harm than good. They push us towards legal, functional, and social nihilism. Today there already exists a Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) that began with Harvard Law School's 1997 conference on the subject.
132
The current idea of a Third World betrays any geographical essentializations. " [Today] [a]ny difference grows faint between democracy and totalitarianism and any political practice proves to be already ensnared in the biopolitical trap."
133 And "the relative autonomy of contemporary international organizations is a function of the fact that they do not seek to advance the interests of one or another advanced capitalist state, but that of the global capitalist system in its different phases." 134 Balakrishnan Rajagopal thinks that the meaning of a Third World remains disarticulated. 135 Žižek's opposition to the politics of human right alludes to Rajagopal's understanding of a hegemonic international law. 136 Žižek asks whether the symbolic fiction "of universal rights be recuperated for the progressive politicization of actual socio-economic relations?" 137 Perhaps humanitarian law's new avatar, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) answers this.
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[Vol. 14, 47 One after another, non-Western states are becoming the Western world's testing grounds: in the last century it was Vietnam, and now Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and parts of Pakistan have led the West to assume the responsibility of protecting Third World humans through rocket launchers, carpet bombs, and the display of ugly military might. Clearly, through R2P, the norms of international law wrestle with anthropology's subjects as international (humanitarian) law lends itself to a new age of the white man's burden. Laden with the assumed responsibility to protect, the Security Council exudes pride in its resolutions. Recently the U.N. Suddenly the role of the League of Arab States in the maintenance of international peace and security in the region came to be recalled. However, as many of us know, no one would follow international law if it did not serve as the vehicle of their interests. Posner and Goldsmith aptly point this out. 140 They conclude, "[b]ased on the record, [Europe] has no grounds to criticize the U.S."
141 All in all, both the United States and Europe, and thus the entire developed world of which the latter is the father or mother, in order to assuage feminist concerns about international law, have shown less than a robust affection for international law. These are multiple moments of truth. The history of "human" rights needs to be recalled at this stage.
C. Žižek, Third World and Human Rights
So, to put it in the Leninist way: what 'human rights of Third World suffering victims' effectively means today, in the predominant discourse, is the right of Western powers themselves to intervene politically, economically, culturally and militarily in the Third World countries of their choice, in the name of defending human rights. 142 In Against Human Rights, Žižek subjects his readers to a set of counterintuitive déjà-vu-s. He recalls the Balkans of the 1990s, the site of widespread human rights violations. His accusations on the capitalist West are telling. Žižek recounts Bisani, an Italian visiting Istanbul in 1788. In his accounts, the Italian dismissed the very feature that the West celebrates today as the sign of its cultural superiority-the spirit and practice of multicultural tolerance as an effect of Islamic "degeneracy." Chimni's insights into the functioning of capitalism are supremely important here; he brings in Marx at the thick of international law's understanding. 158 We then begin to understand why the makers and suppliers of international law fear Marxist views on its reevaluation. Similar concerns lead Žižek to expose capitalism's permanent state of emergency that spawns the privatization of general intellect, for example, in Europe's Bologna process, "orienting education towards the production of expert knowledge." 159 Its effects on international law are telling. Apropos to Chimni, global capitalism is changing bourgeois democratic international law to a bourgeois imperial international law. First, in contrast to the formal definitions of international law and its doctrines offered by [mainsteam international law scholarship (MILS)], CMILS advances more meaningful definitions that distinguish the character of international law and its doctrines in different historical phases and identifies the groups/classes/states that are the principal movers and beneficiaries. CMILS contends that while MILS does use the categories of interest and power in analyzing [customary international law (CIL)], the manner in which these categories are deployed deprives them of critical edge. Thus MILS works with the empty concept of national interest, excluding the possibility of discovering particular group or class interests that determine its content. Likewise, the concept of power is mostly identified with its more overt and discrete manifestations rather than being understood as a force that continuously informs the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of international law. Id. at 3-4. 159 Žižek, supra note 96, at 90. David Brooks might agree with Žižek while talking about the United States. He says, " [f] or the past 30 years we've tried many different ways to restructure our educational system-trying big schools and little schools, charters and vouchers-that, for years, skirted the core issue: the relationship between a teacher and a student." Brooks, supra note 44, at A8. 160 See, for a very detailed discussion, Chimni, Prolegomena to a Class Approach, supra note 10, at 57 ("Noting the emergence of a global social formation the article claims that a transnational capitalist class is shaping international laws and institutions in the era of globalization. It calls for the linking of the class critique of contemporary laws and institutions with the idea and practices of resistance, and considers in this setting the meaning of internationalism and class struggle today for an emerging transnational oppressed class. The article concludes by schematically outlining the advantages of a class approach to international law.").
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[Vol. 14, 47 social relationships." 164 However, Sartre's parsimonious objectivity exhibits an occasional lapse into subjectivity as he finds an objective explanation of colonialism incomplete. 165 And then, as is very apparent in his critique de la raison dialectiq, he eventually attempts "to transcend the objective-subjective dichotomy and to perceive the actions of human beings, members of particular classes or groups, as products both of objective material forces and of more or less freely chosen intentions, transcending material condition." 166 Thus international law for the Third World transforms into an intimate enemy. We have to learn to live with it; after all, not all of it is bad, goes the argument. Thus TWAIL, as Third World scholars' approach to studying international law's existing administrative and capital promoting structure, is a project to explore that "human will." 
B. Economic Approach to International Law
The logic of economics, now very commonplace among American lawyers and certain American schools has blossomed, ignoring Adorno's insight about societies where domination always outlasts economic planning. 168 Economics' instrumental reason objectifies nature as matter, men as producers (and consumers), and nature-man's interaction as a product. 169 This recipe turns market freedom into an administrative plan. One would then expect a bit of a loss of repression with every step of planning completed. More and more repression is the result instead. Sartre, it is argued, "exposes unmercifully" how the Western conception of "the picturesque and exotic serves to justify" the Western "treatment of the natives as objects, rather than as human beings." 170 A pro-capital technological society demands individuals' compliance and adjustment at the cost of freedom. Quite naturally the demanding capitalists and the "demandee" Third World stand in opposition. After international law's proven colonial birth, its psychological evaluation as an intimate enemy brings Nietzsche 
